SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 21
Download to read offline
Offline bruteforce attack on
WiFi Protected Setup
Dominique Bongard
Founder
0xcite, Switzerland
@reversity
§  Protocol aiming at easily connecting to protected WiFi networks
§  Two main modes: Push-Button and 8 digit PIN code
§  Gives the WPA passphrase to stations providing the right PIN
§  Poor design and implementation
Stefan Viehböck
Stefan Viehböck
§  Brute force each half of the PIN
§  Maximum 10‘000 tries + 1‘000 tries
§  No limitation on number of tries in many AP
§  Takes a few hours (depends on the AP)
§  Largely slowed down in new devices (lock-out)
§  Many AP still sold with WPS PIN activated
STA
Nonce
E-Hash1 E-Hash2 HMAC
AES(HMAC(PIN1),E-S1) AES(HMAC(PIN2),E-S2)
§  If we can guess E-S1 and E-S2, we can the
brute force PIN1 and PIN2 offline!
§  Pixie dust attack!
§  Usually with pseudo-random generators (PRNG)
§  Often insecure PRNG
§  No or low entropy
§  Small state (32 bits)
§  Can the PRNG state be recovered ?
int rand_r( unsigned int *seed ) {
unsigned int s=*seed;
unsigned int uret;
s = (s * 1103515245) + 12345; // permutate seed
uret = s & 0xffe00000;// Only use top 11 bits
s = (s * 1103515245) + 12345; // permutate seed
uret += (s & 0xfffc0000) >> 11;// Only use top 14 bits
s = (s * 1103515245) + 12345; // permutate seed
uret += (s & 0xfe000000) >> (11+14);// Only use top 7 bits
retval = (int)(uret & RAND_MAX);
*seed = s;
return retval; }
AP Nonce Description PK
§  Linear Congruential Generator
§  32 bits state
§  No external entropy
§  E-S1 and E-S2 generated right after the Nonce
§  Do the WPS protocol up to message M3
§  Get the Nonce from M1
§  Bruteforce the state of the PRNG
§  Compute E-S1 and E-S2 from the state
§  Decrypt E-Hash1 and E-Hash2
§  Bruteforce Pin1 and Pin2
§  Do the full WPS protocol and get the passphrase
§  Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR)
§  Broken
§  Doesn‘t matter the keys are always NULL !!
§  Some AP have the same state at each boot
§  Make a list of common states after reboot
§  Attack the AP right after boot
§  Trigger the breakers
§  DDOS the AP
§  Jam the signal until the target reboots the AP
§  Looks okay
§  Uses /dev/random
§  Found in Atheros SDK
§  But you never know
§  Several papers attack the entropy of the linux
PRNG in embedded systems
§  It‘s complicated
§  Many of the implementations are the reference
code for the chipset
§  Only the GUI is reskinned
§  Therefore many brands are affected
§  Many vendors use different chipset
§  Even for the same model number
§  Disable WPS now !
§  Reverse engineers: Check other AP for bad PRNG
§  Cryptographers: Check if good PRNG are okay

More Related Content

What's hot

Networking and penetration testing
Networking and penetration testingNetworking and penetration testing
Networking and penetration testingMohit Belwal
 
Introduction to Dynamic Malware Analysis ...Or am I "Cuckoo for Malware?"
Introduction to Dynamic Malware Analysis   ...Or am I "Cuckoo for Malware?"Introduction to Dynamic Malware Analysis   ...Or am I "Cuckoo for Malware?"
Introduction to Dynamic Malware Analysis ...Or am I "Cuckoo for Malware?"Lane Huff
 
Network Security Nmap N Nessus
Network Security Nmap N NessusNetwork Security Nmap N Nessus
Network Security Nmap N NessusUtkarsh Verma
 
Introduction to Web Application Penetration Testing
Introduction to Web Application Penetration TestingIntroduction to Web Application Penetration Testing
Introduction to Web Application Penetration TestingNetsparker
 
Metasploit
MetasploitMetasploit
Metasploithenelpj
 
Threat Hunting with Splunk
Threat Hunting with SplunkThreat Hunting with Splunk
Threat Hunting with SplunkSplunk
 
Understanding Information Security Assessment Types
Understanding Information Security Assessment TypesUnderstanding Information Security Assessment Types
Understanding Information Security Assessment TypesHackerOne
 
WEP/WPA attacks
WEP/WPA attacksWEP/WPA attacks
WEP/WPA attacksHuda Seyam
 
Malware analysis _ Threat Intelligence Morocco
Malware analysis _ Threat Intelligence MoroccoMalware analysis _ Threat Intelligence Morocco
Malware analysis _ Threat Intelligence MoroccoTouhami Kasbaoui
 
Android Security
Android SecurityAndroid Security
Android SecurityLars Jacobs
 
Wireless LAN Security, Policy, and Deployment Best Practices
Wireless LAN Security, Policy, and Deployment Best PracticesWireless LAN Security, Policy, and Deployment Best Practices
Wireless LAN Security, Policy, and Deployment Best PracticesCisco Mobility
 
Demo of security tool nessus - Network vulnerablity scanner
Demo of security tool nessus - Network vulnerablity scannerDemo of security tool nessus - Network vulnerablity scanner
Demo of security tool nessus - Network vulnerablity scannerAjit Dadresa
 
penetration test using Kali linux ppt
penetration test using Kali linux pptpenetration test using Kali linux ppt
penetration test using Kali linux pptAbhayNaik8
 

What's hot (20)

Networking and penetration testing
Networking and penetration testingNetworking and penetration testing
Networking and penetration testing
 
Introduction to Dynamic Malware Analysis ...Or am I "Cuckoo for Malware?"
Introduction to Dynamic Malware Analysis   ...Or am I "Cuckoo for Malware?"Introduction to Dynamic Malware Analysis   ...Or am I "Cuckoo for Malware?"
Introduction to Dynamic Malware Analysis ...Or am I "Cuckoo for Malware?"
 
Network Security Nmap N Nessus
Network Security Nmap N NessusNetwork Security Nmap N Nessus
Network Security Nmap N Nessus
 
Aircrack
AircrackAircrack
Aircrack
 
Introduction to Web Application Penetration Testing
Introduction to Web Application Penetration TestingIntroduction to Web Application Penetration Testing
Introduction to Web Application Penetration Testing
 
malware analysis
malware  analysismalware  analysis
malware analysis
 
I Heart Stuxnet
I Heart StuxnetI Heart Stuxnet
I Heart Stuxnet
 
Metasploit
MetasploitMetasploit
Metasploit
 
Threat Hunting with Splunk
Threat Hunting with SplunkThreat Hunting with Splunk
Threat Hunting with Splunk
 
Malware analysis
Malware analysisMalware analysis
Malware analysis
 
network
networknetwork
network
 
Understanding Information Security Assessment Types
Understanding Information Security Assessment TypesUnderstanding Information Security Assessment Types
Understanding Information Security Assessment Types
 
WEP/WPA attacks
WEP/WPA attacksWEP/WPA attacks
WEP/WPA attacks
 
Malware
MalwareMalware
Malware
 
Keylogger
KeyloggerKeylogger
Keylogger
 
Malware analysis _ Threat Intelligence Morocco
Malware analysis _ Threat Intelligence MoroccoMalware analysis _ Threat Intelligence Morocco
Malware analysis _ Threat Intelligence Morocco
 
Android Security
Android SecurityAndroid Security
Android Security
 
Wireless LAN Security, Policy, and Deployment Best Practices
Wireless LAN Security, Policy, and Deployment Best PracticesWireless LAN Security, Policy, and Deployment Best Practices
Wireless LAN Security, Policy, and Deployment Best Practices
 
Demo of security tool nessus - Network vulnerablity scanner
Demo of security tool nessus - Network vulnerablity scannerDemo of security tool nessus - Network vulnerablity scanner
Demo of security tool nessus - Network vulnerablity scanner
 
penetration test using Kali linux ppt
penetration test using Kali linux pptpenetration test using Kali linux ppt
penetration test using Kali linux ppt
 

Similar to Offline bruteforce attack on WiFi Protected Setup

Offline bruteforce attack on wi fi protected setup
Offline bruteforce attack on wi fi protected setupOffline bruteforce attack on wi fi protected setup
Offline bruteforce attack on wi fi protected setupCyber Security Alliance
 
2. Stream Ciphers
2. Stream Ciphers2. Stream Ciphers
2. Stream CiphersSam Bowne
 
BlackHat 2009 - Hacking Zigbee Chips (slides)
BlackHat 2009 - Hacking Zigbee Chips (slides)BlackHat 2009 - Hacking Zigbee Chips (slides)
BlackHat 2009 - Hacking Zigbee Chips (slides)Michael Smith
 
One-Wire-Serial-Communication.pdf
One-Wire-Serial-Communication.pdfOne-Wire-Serial-Communication.pdf
One-Wire-Serial-Communication.pdfshamtekawambwa1
 
Serial Peripheral Interface
Serial Peripheral InterfaceSerial Peripheral Interface
Serial Peripheral InterfaceChirag Parikh
 
Open-E DSS V6 Synchronous Volume Replication with Failover over a LAN with Un...
Open-E DSS V6 Synchronous Volume Replication with Failover over a LAN with Un...Open-E DSS V6 Synchronous Volume Replication with Failover over a LAN with Un...
Open-E DSS V6 Synchronous Volume Replication with Failover over a LAN with Un...open-e
 
Open-E DSS V6 Synchronous Volume Replication With Failover over a LAN with Br...
Open-E DSS V6 Synchronous Volume Replication With Failover over a LAN with Br...Open-E DSS V6 Synchronous Volume Replication With Failover over a LAN with Br...
Open-E DSS V6 Synchronous Volume Replication With Failover over a LAN with Br...open-e
 
Attacking Industrial Remote Controllers (HITB AMS 2019)
Attacking Industrial Remote Controllers (HITB AMS 2019)Attacking Industrial Remote Controllers (HITB AMS 2019)
Attacking Industrial Remote Controllers (HITB AMS 2019)Marco Balduzzi
 
Buffer overflow – Smashing The Stack
Buffer overflow – Smashing The StackBuffer overflow – Smashing The Stack
Buffer overflow – Smashing The StackTomer Zait
 
Buffer Overflow - Smashing the Stack
Buffer Overflow - Smashing the StackBuffer Overflow - Smashing the Stack
Buffer Overflow - Smashing the StackironSource
 
Making multiplayer game with Elixir and Elm
Making multiplayer game with Elixir and ElmMaking multiplayer game with Elixir and Elm
Making multiplayer game with Elixir and Elmnetzke
 
side-channel-kevin2600
side-channel-kevin2600side-channel-kevin2600
side-channel-kevin2600Kevin2600
 
Et4045-3-attacks-2
Et4045-3-attacks-2Et4045-3-attacks-2
Et4045-3-attacks-2Tutun Juhana
 
Micro control idsecconf2010
Micro control idsecconf2010Micro control idsecconf2010
Micro control idsecconf2010idsecconf
 
Spi master core verification
Spi master core verificationSpi master core verification
Spi master core verificationMaulik Suthar
 
63071507 interrupts-up
63071507 interrupts-up63071507 interrupts-up
63071507 interrupts-uptt_aljobory
 
Arduino Platform with C programming.
Arduino Platform with C programming.Arduino Platform with C programming.
Arduino Platform with C programming.Govind Jha
 
Step-by-Step Guide to NAS (NFS) Failover over a LAN (with unicast) Supported ...
Step-by-Step Guide to NAS (NFS) Failover over a LAN (with unicast) Supported ...Step-by-Step Guide to NAS (NFS) Failover over a LAN (with unicast) Supported ...
Step-by-Step Guide to NAS (NFS) Failover over a LAN (with unicast) Supported ...open-e
 
Demystifying Secure enclave processor
Demystifying Secure enclave processorDemystifying Secure enclave processor
Demystifying Secure enclave processorPriyanka Aash
 

Similar to Offline bruteforce attack on WiFi Protected Setup (20)

Offline bruteforce attack on wi fi protected setup
Offline bruteforce attack on wi fi protected setupOffline bruteforce attack on wi fi protected setup
Offline bruteforce attack on wi fi protected setup
 
2. Stream Ciphers
2. Stream Ciphers2. Stream Ciphers
2. Stream Ciphers
 
BlackHat 2009 - Hacking Zigbee Chips (slides)
BlackHat 2009 - Hacking Zigbee Chips (slides)BlackHat 2009 - Hacking Zigbee Chips (slides)
BlackHat 2009 - Hacking Zigbee Chips (slides)
 
Remote tanklevelmonitor
Remote tanklevelmonitorRemote tanklevelmonitor
Remote tanklevelmonitor
 
One-Wire-Serial-Communication.pdf
One-Wire-Serial-Communication.pdfOne-Wire-Serial-Communication.pdf
One-Wire-Serial-Communication.pdf
 
Serial Peripheral Interface
Serial Peripheral InterfaceSerial Peripheral Interface
Serial Peripheral Interface
 
Open-E DSS V6 Synchronous Volume Replication with Failover over a LAN with Un...
Open-E DSS V6 Synchronous Volume Replication with Failover over a LAN with Un...Open-E DSS V6 Synchronous Volume Replication with Failover over a LAN with Un...
Open-E DSS V6 Synchronous Volume Replication with Failover over a LAN with Un...
 
Open-E DSS V6 Synchronous Volume Replication With Failover over a LAN with Br...
Open-E DSS V6 Synchronous Volume Replication With Failover over a LAN with Br...Open-E DSS V6 Synchronous Volume Replication With Failover over a LAN with Br...
Open-E DSS V6 Synchronous Volume Replication With Failover over a LAN with Br...
 
Attacking Industrial Remote Controllers (HITB AMS 2019)
Attacking Industrial Remote Controllers (HITB AMS 2019)Attacking Industrial Remote Controllers (HITB AMS 2019)
Attacking Industrial Remote Controllers (HITB AMS 2019)
 
Buffer overflow – Smashing The Stack
Buffer overflow – Smashing The StackBuffer overflow – Smashing The Stack
Buffer overflow – Smashing The Stack
 
Buffer Overflow - Smashing the Stack
Buffer Overflow - Smashing the StackBuffer Overflow - Smashing the Stack
Buffer Overflow - Smashing the Stack
 
Making multiplayer game with Elixir and Elm
Making multiplayer game with Elixir and ElmMaking multiplayer game with Elixir and Elm
Making multiplayer game with Elixir and Elm
 
side-channel-kevin2600
side-channel-kevin2600side-channel-kevin2600
side-channel-kevin2600
 
Et4045-3-attacks-2
Et4045-3-attacks-2Et4045-3-attacks-2
Et4045-3-attacks-2
 
Micro control idsecconf2010
Micro control idsecconf2010Micro control idsecconf2010
Micro control idsecconf2010
 
Spi master core verification
Spi master core verificationSpi master core verification
Spi master core verification
 
63071507 interrupts-up
63071507 interrupts-up63071507 interrupts-up
63071507 interrupts-up
 
Arduino Platform with C programming.
Arduino Platform with C programming.Arduino Platform with C programming.
Arduino Platform with C programming.
 
Step-by-Step Guide to NAS (NFS) Failover over a LAN (with unicast) Supported ...
Step-by-Step Guide to NAS (NFS) Failover over a LAN (with unicast) Supported ...Step-by-Step Guide to NAS (NFS) Failover over a LAN (with unicast) Supported ...
Step-by-Step Guide to NAS (NFS) Failover over a LAN (with unicast) Supported ...
 
Demystifying Secure enclave processor
Demystifying Secure enclave processorDemystifying Secure enclave processor
Demystifying Secure enclave processor
 

Recently uploaded

So einfach geht modernes Roaming fuer Notes und Nomad.pdf
So einfach geht modernes Roaming fuer Notes und Nomad.pdfSo einfach geht modernes Roaming fuer Notes und Nomad.pdf
So einfach geht modernes Roaming fuer Notes und Nomad.pdfpanagenda
 
Landscape Catalogue 2024 Australia-1.pdf
Landscape Catalogue 2024 Australia-1.pdfLandscape Catalogue 2024 Australia-1.pdf
Landscape Catalogue 2024 Australia-1.pdfAarwolf Industries LLC
 
UiPath Community: Communication Mining from Zero to Hero
UiPath Community: Communication Mining from Zero to HeroUiPath Community: Communication Mining from Zero to Hero
UiPath Community: Communication Mining from Zero to HeroUiPathCommunity
 
A Framework for Development in the AI Age
A Framework for Development in the AI AgeA Framework for Development in the AI Age
A Framework for Development in the AI AgeCprime
 
A Glance At The Java Performance Toolbox
A Glance At The Java Performance ToolboxA Glance At The Java Performance Toolbox
A Glance At The Java Performance ToolboxAna-Maria Mihalceanu
 
Design pattern talk by Kaya Weers - 2024 (v2)
Design pattern talk by Kaya Weers - 2024 (v2)Design pattern talk by Kaya Weers - 2024 (v2)
Design pattern talk by Kaya Weers - 2024 (v2)Kaya Weers
 
Emixa Mendix Meetup 11 April 2024 about Mendix Native development
Emixa Mendix Meetup 11 April 2024 about Mendix Native developmentEmixa Mendix Meetup 11 April 2024 about Mendix Native development
Emixa Mendix Meetup 11 April 2024 about Mendix Native developmentPim van der Noll
 
Genislab builds better products and faster go-to-market with Lean project man...
Genislab builds better products and faster go-to-market with Lean project man...Genislab builds better products and faster go-to-market with Lean project man...
Genislab builds better products and faster go-to-market with Lean project man...Farhan Tariq
 
Bridging Between CAD & GIS: 6 Ways to Automate Your Data Integration
Bridging Between CAD & GIS:  6 Ways to Automate Your Data IntegrationBridging Between CAD & GIS:  6 Ways to Automate Your Data Integration
Bridging Between CAD & GIS: 6 Ways to Automate Your Data Integrationmarketing932765
 
Testing tools and AI - ideas what to try with some tool examples
Testing tools and AI - ideas what to try with some tool examplesTesting tools and AI - ideas what to try with some tool examples
Testing tools and AI - ideas what to try with some tool examplesKari Kakkonen
 
QCon London: Mastering long-running processes in modern architectures
QCon London: Mastering long-running processes in modern architecturesQCon London: Mastering long-running processes in modern architectures
QCon London: Mastering long-running processes in modern architecturesBernd Ruecker
 
Microservices, Docker deploy and Microservices source code in C#
Microservices, Docker deploy and Microservices source code in C#Microservices, Docker deploy and Microservices source code in C#
Microservices, Docker deploy and Microservices source code in C#Karmanjay Verma
 
Generative Artificial Intelligence: How generative AI works.pdf
Generative Artificial Intelligence: How generative AI works.pdfGenerative Artificial Intelligence: How generative AI works.pdf
Generative Artificial Intelligence: How generative AI works.pdfIngrid Airi González
 
Varsha Sewlal- Cyber Attacks on Critical Critical Infrastructure
Varsha Sewlal- Cyber Attacks on Critical Critical InfrastructureVarsha Sewlal- Cyber Attacks on Critical Critical Infrastructure
Varsha Sewlal- Cyber Attacks on Critical Critical Infrastructureitnewsafrica
 
All These Sophisticated Attacks, Can We Really Detect Them - PDF
All These Sophisticated Attacks, Can We Really Detect Them - PDFAll These Sophisticated Attacks, Can We Really Detect Them - PDF
All These Sophisticated Attacks, Can We Really Detect Them - PDFMichael Gough
 
Microsoft 365 Copilot: How to boost your productivity with AI – Part one: Ado...
Microsoft 365 Copilot: How to boost your productivity with AI – Part one: Ado...Microsoft 365 Copilot: How to boost your productivity with AI – Part one: Ado...
Microsoft 365 Copilot: How to boost your productivity with AI – Part one: Ado...Nikki Chapple
 
Infrared simulation and processing on Nvidia platforms
Infrared simulation and processing on Nvidia platformsInfrared simulation and processing on Nvidia platforms
Infrared simulation and processing on Nvidia platformsYoss Cohen
 
Accelerating Enterprise Software Engineering with Platformless
Accelerating Enterprise Software Engineering with PlatformlessAccelerating Enterprise Software Engineering with Platformless
Accelerating Enterprise Software Engineering with PlatformlessWSO2
 
Time Series Foundation Models - current state and future directions
Time Series Foundation Models - current state and future directionsTime Series Foundation Models - current state and future directions
Time Series Foundation Models - current state and future directionsNathaniel Shimoni
 
Why device, WIFI, and ISP insights are crucial to supporting remote Microsoft...
Why device, WIFI, and ISP insights are crucial to supporting remote Microsoft...Why device, WIFI, and ISP insights are crucial to supporting remote Microsoft...
Why device, WIFI, and ISP insights are crucial to supporting remote Microsoft...panagenda
 

Recently uploaded (20)

So einfach geht modernes Roaming fuer Notes und Nomad.pdf
So einfach geht modernes Roaming fuer Notes und Nomad.pdfSo einfach geht modernes Roaming fuer Notes und Nomad.pdf
So einfach geht modernes Roaming fuer Notes und Nomad.pdf
 
Landscape Catalogue 2024 Australia-1.pdf
Landscape Catalogue 2024 Australia-1.pdfLandscape Catalogue 2024 Australia-1.pdf
Landscape Catalogue 2024 Australia-1.pdf
 
UiPath Community: Communication Mining from Zero to Hero
UiPath Community: Communication Mining from Zero to HeroUiPath Community: Communication Mining from Zero to Hero
UiPath Community: Communication Mining from Zero to Hero
 
A Framework for Development in the AI Age
A Framework for Development in the AI AgeA Framework for Development in the AI Age
A Framework for Development in the AI Age
 
A Glance At The Java Performance Toolbox
A Glance At The Java Performance ToolboxA Glance At The Java Performance Toolbox
A Glance At The Java Performance Toolbox
 
Design pattern talk by Kaya Weers - 2024 (v2)
Design pattern talk by Kaya Weers - 2024 (v2)Design pattern talk by Kaya Weers - 2024 (v2)
Design pattern talk by Kaya Weers - 2024 (v2)
 
Emixa Mendix Meetup 11 April 2024 about Mendix Native development
Emixa Mendix Meetup 11 April 2024 about Mendix Native developmentEmixa Mendix Meetup 11 April 2024 about Mendix Native development
Emixa Mendix Meetup 11 April 2024 about Mendix Native development
 
Genislab builds better products and faster go-to-market with Lean project man...
Genislab builds better products and faster go-to-market with Lean project man...Genislab builds better products and faster go-to-market with Lean project man...
Genislab builds better products and faster go-to-market with Lean project man...
 
Bridging Between CAD & GIS: 6 Ways to Automate Your Data Integration
Bridging Between CAD & GIS:  6 Ways to Automate Your Data IntegrationBridging Between CAD & GIS:  6 Ways to Automate Your Data Integration
Bridging Between CAD & GIS: 6 Ways to Automate Your Data Integration
 
Testing tools and AI - ideas what to try with some tool examples
Testing tools and AI - ideas what to try with some tool examplesTesting tools and AI - ideas what to try with some tool examples
Testing tools and AI - ideas what to try with some tool examples
 
QCon London: Mastering long-running processes in modern architectures
QCon London: Mastering long-running processes in modern architecturesQCon London: Mastering long-running processes in modern architectures
QCon London: Mastering long-running processes in modern architectures
 
Microservices, Docker deploy and Microservices source code in C#
Microservices, Docker deploy and Microservices source code in C#Microservices, Docker deploy and Microservices source code in C#
Microservices, Docker deploy and Microservices source code in C#
 
Generative Artificial Intelligence: How generative AI works.pdf
Generative Artificial Intelligence: How generative AI works.pdfGenerative Artificial Intelligence: How generative AI works.pdf
Generative Artificial Intelligence: How generative AI works.pdf
 
Varsha Sewlal- Cyber Attacks on Critical Critical Infrastructure
Varsha Sewlal- Cyber Attacks on Critical Critical InfrastructureVarsha Sewlal- Cyber Attacks on Critical Critical Infrastructure
Varsha Sewlal- Cyber Attacks on Critical Critical Infrastructure
 
All These Sophisticated Attacks, Can We Really Detect Them - PDF
All These Sophisticated Attacks, Can We Really Detect Them - PDFAll These Sophisticated Attacks, Can We Really Detect Them - PDF
All These Sophisticated Attacks, Can We Really Detect Them - PDF
 
Microsoft 365 Copilot: How to boost your productivity with AI – Part one: Ado...
Microsoft 365 Copilot: How to boost your productivity with AI – Part one: Ado...Microsoft 365 Copilot: How to boost your productivity with AI – Part one: Ado...
Microsoft 365 Copilot: How to boost your productivity with AI – Part one: Ado...
 
Infrared simulation and processing on Nvidia platforms
Infrared simulation and processing on Nvidia platformsInfrared simulation and processing on Nvidia platforms
Infrared simulation and processing on Nvidia platforms
 
Accelerating Enterprise Software Engineering with Platformless
Accelerating Enterprise Software Engineering with PlatformlessAccelerating Enterprise Software Engineering with Platformless
Accelerating Enterprise Software Engineering with Platformless
 
Time Series Foundation Models - current state and future directions
Time Series Foundation Models - current state and future directionsTime Series Foundation Models - current state and future directions
Time Series Foundation Models - current state and future directions
 
Why device, WIFI, and ISP insights are crucial to supporting remote Microsoft...
Why device, WIFI, and ISP insights are crucial to supporting remote Microsoft...Why device, WIFI, and ISP insights are crucial to supporting remote Microsoft...
Why device, WIFI, and ISP insights are crucial to supporting remote Microsoft...
 

Offline bruteforce attack on WiFi Protected Setup

  • 1. Offline bruteforce attack on WiFi Protected Setup Dominique Bongard Founder 0xcite, Switzerland @reversity
  • 2. §  Protocol aiming at easily connecting to protected WiFi networks §  Two main modes: Push-Button and 8 digit PIN code §  Gives the WPA passphrase to stations providing the right PIN §  Poor design and implementation
  • 3.
  • 4.
  • 7. §  Brute force each half of the PIN §  Maximum 10‘000 tries + 1‘000 tries §  No limitation on number of tries in many AP §  Takes a few hours (depends on the AP) §  Largely slowed down in new devices (lock-out) §  Many AP still sold with WPS PIN activated
  • 8.
  • 10. §  If we can guess E-S1 and E-S2, we can the brute force PIN1 and PIN2 offline! §  Pixie dust attack!
  • 11. §  Usually with pseudo-random generators (PRNG) §  Often insecure PRNG §  No or low entropy §  Small state (32 bits) §  Can the PRNG state be recovered ?
  • 12. int rand_r( unsigned int *seed ) { unsigned int s=*seed; unsigned int uret; s = (s * 1103515245) + 12345; // permutate seed uret = s & 0xffe00000;// Only use top 11 bits s = (s * 1103515245) + 12345; // permutate seed uret += (s & 0xfffc0000) >> 11;// Only use top 14 bits s = (s * 1103515245) + 12345; // permutate seed uret += (s & 0xfe000000) >> (11+14);// Only use top 7 bits retval = (int)(uret & RAND_MAX); *seed = s; return retval; }
  • 14. §  Linear Congruential Generator §  32 bits state §  No external entropy §  E-S1 and E-S2 generated right after the Nonce
  • 15. §  Do the WPS protocol up to message M3 §  Get the Nonce from M1 §  Bruteforce the state of the PRNG §  Compute E-S1 and E-S2 from the state §  Decrypt E-Hash1 and E-Hash2 §  Bruteforce Pin1 and Pin2 §  Do the full WPS protocol and get the passphrase
  • 16. §  Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) §  Broken §  Doesn‘t matter the keys are always NULL !!
  • 17. §  Some AP have the same state at each boot §  Make a list of common states after reboot §  Attack the AP right after boot
  • 18. §  Trigger the breakers §  DDOS the AP §  Jam the signal until the target reboots the AP
  • 19. §  Looks okay §  Uses /dev/random §  Found in Atheros SDK §  But you never know §  Several papers attack the entropy of the linux PRNG in embedded systems
  • 20. §  It‘s complicated §  Many of the implementations are the reference code for the chipset §  Only the GUI is reskinned §  Therefore many brands are affected §  Many vendors use different chipset §  Even for the same model number
  • 21. §  Disable WPS now ! §  Reverse engineers: Check other AP for bad PRNG §  Cryptographers: Check if good PRNG are okay